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**RUSSIAN-AMERICAN COOPERATION IN
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
COUNTERPROLIFERATION**

by

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September, 1996

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Captain, United States Air Force
B.A., Michigan State University, 1980

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

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from the

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
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


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
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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the opportunities and risks associated with a new form of military cooperation between the United States and Russia: joint strategic special operations for counter-proliferation contingencies--to seize and secure, or to disable or otherwise neutralize weapons of mass destruction (WMD) facilities or WMD-armed terrorists. This thesis compares Russian and U.S. views of the future security environment, looking for areas of overlap that could serve as the basis for mutually acceptable cooperative approaches to military options--especially in areas in or around the former Soviet Union-- to deal with new WMD threats. The most effective military options might require the creation of a Russian-American response force similar to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST), expanded to be usable against a wide variety of WMD threats. This thesis analyzes the circumstances in which Russian-American SOF cooperation is more likely to succeed than U.S. unilateral action. The analysis concludes that information-sharing may be the most likely form of cooperation, although any Russian-American cooperative effort would reveal to the other side sensitive information about capabilities and vulnerabilities in that area of cooperation.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This thesis examines the opportunities and risks associated with a new form of military cooperation between the United States and Russia: joint strategic special operations for counterproliferation contingencies--to seize and secure, or to disable or otherwise neutralize weapons of mass destruction (WMD) facilities or WMD-armed terrorists. This thesis compares Russian and U.S. views of the future security environment, looking for areas of overlap that could serve as the basis for mutually acceptable cooperative approaches to military options to deal with new WMD threats. The most effective military options--especially in areas in or around the former Soviet Union--might require the creation of a Russian-American response force similar to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST), expanded to be usable against a wide variety of WMD threats. This thesis analyzes the circumstances in which Russian-American SOF cooperation is more likely to succeed than U.S. unilateral action.

Information-sharing could serve the purpose of Russian-American cooperation in WMD counterproliferation, and this may initially be the most likely area of cooperation. A major difficulty is that while the United States and Russia currently enjoy good relations, a change in the Russian political

leadership could rapidly reverse this, and previously provided information could be used to the detriment of U.S. security interests. The proposed solution to this difficulty is to make agreements to share needed information only when the circumstances of the situation make it expedient to do so.

The United States still might have a "window of opportunity" to engage the Russians in bilateral counterproliferation activities, one component of which could be contingency SOF counterforce exercises. Because it is the primary inheritor of the former Soviet Union's WMD arsenal, Russia's involvement is essential to prevent a loss of control over these WMD materials and associated expertise. The disorganization following the breakup of the Soviet Union and current economic difficulties in the former Soviet states make this region the most likely source of leakage of weapons of mass destruction, fissile materials and WMD expertise. The cooperation envisioned by this thesis need not require substantial new resources; equipment and training already provided or in place could be sufficient if innovative operational planning was undertaken. The effectiveness of any policy to prevent or counter WMD proliferation could be enhanced by including Russia in its development and execution.

I. INTRODUCTION

This thesis examines the desirability of cooperation between the United States and Russia to conduct joint strategic special operations.¹ Cooperation using special operations forces (SOF) might be particularly useful in counterproliferation contingencies--to seize and secure, disable, or otherwise neutralize weapons of mass destruction (WMD) facilities or WMD-armed terrorists. U.S. leadership in this effort is a responsibility derived from America's role as a global superpower. Although Russia is distracted by its economic and internal political struggles, WMD proliferation is a long-term threat to Russian security as well. Moreover, as David Yost has noted, "nuclear forces offer one of the few ways Russia has left to claim superpower status and prestige."² The Russians therefore have multiple incentives to prevent a proliferation of nuclear weapons to other powers, and by extension all forms of WMD.

¹Defined as "secret military or paramilitary strikes ...that seek to resolve through the sudden, swift, and unconventional application of force major problems of U.S. foreign policy" in Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 4.

²David S. Yost, "Europe and Nuclear Deterrence," Survival, vol. 35, no. 3 (Autumn 1993), p. 103.

Preventive diplomacy remains the first line of defense in the campaign against the spread of WMD. The goal of nonproliferation diplomacy in this regard is to ensure multinational cooperation in export controls, border controls, and police actions, as most WMD material and related technology from Russia is exported through official channels.³ When the threat presented overwhelms the capabilities of these civilian agencies, military force might provide the only means to deal with the problem.⁴

This thesis compares Russian and U.S. views of the future security environment, particularly with regard to WMD proliferation contingencies which might exceed the capabilities of civilian agencies. The comparison looks for areas of overlap that could serve as the basis for mutually acceptable cooperative approaches to military responses to these threats. The thesis then examines the possible ways that information-sharing could serve the purpose of Russian-American cooperation in WMD counterproliferation, as this may initially be the most likely area of cooperation.

The most effective military options might require the

³William C. Potter, "Before the Deluge? Assessing the Threat of Nuclear Leakage From the Post-Soviet States," Arms Control Today, vol. 25, no. 8 (October 1995), p. 14.

⁴Barbara Starr, "Law Enforcement Role Sought for U.S. Military," Jane's Defence Weekly, 29 April 95, p. 5.

creation of a Russian-American response force similar to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST), expanded to be usable against nuclear, biological and chemical threats (referred to in this thesis as NBC-EST). The NEST methodology is to bring to the area of a suspected nuclear device specially-trained experts in nuclear weapons design, together with the FBI and public safety officials, to search for and (if necessary) disarm the device. This thesis suggests how this methodology could be made effective against nuclear, chemical and biological threats through "electronic reach-back" techniques currently being explored by the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) Commandant's Warfighting Lab (CWL).

A. U.S. COUNTERPROLIFERATION POLICY

Today the idea of conducting preemptive military strikes, usually with the image of the June 1981 Israeli raid against Iraq's Osirak reactor in mind, produces international anxiety. When counterproliferation was announced as the first major defense initiative of the Clinton administration, many feared that the United States, as the world's sole superpower, was now devising the means to unilaterally and preemptively destroy the nuclear programs of countries in the developing world. Faced with this outcry, the Clinton administration backtracked. According to Harald Muller and Mitchell Reiss, "although some Pentagon officials privately admit that counterproliferation

still envisions preemptive military strikes, more senior officials, especially Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, have explicitly and repeatedly disavowed any such role."⁵

Western nations have raised several objections to the idea of the U.S. or NATO planning preemptive military strikes. The most important is that such military action should be sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council. The Security Council on 31 January 1992, with the support of the United States, declared that the proliferation of WMD constituted a threat to international peace and security. This opened the possibility of utilizing all the sanctions available under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, including military measures, in response to WMD proliferation threats.⁶ Other objections included the possible collateral consequences of preemptive strikes, such as radioactive fallout, and the fear that military options might be seen as more attractive than diplomatic and economic ones.

Current Clinton administration counterproliferation policy emphasizes that military forces are more likely to be called on to protect a country threatened by WMD than to strike a state's WMD facilities. In this regard there has been considerable investment in protective technologies, particularly for ballistic

⁵Harald Muller and Mitchell Reiss, "Counterproliferation: Putting New Wine in Old Bottles," The Washington Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 2 (Spring 1995), p. 143.

⁶Ibid., p. 146-147.

missile defense. Special operations forces continue to quietly train for counterforce operations which range from being able to find and destroy mobile missiles to neutralizing underground facilities. Such actions might be termed "neutralization" of WMD capabilities after the war has started, but the same weapons and tactics could easily be used for preventive or preemptive purposes before the onset of hostilities.

B. U.S. POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA

The United States has long-term political motives for trying to obtain Russian cooperation in a coalition for WMD counterproliferation contingencies. According to the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), "the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative places great emphasis on international cooperation in preparation for future crises or conflicts where the threat or use of [WMD] may be present."⁷ The benefits of international cooperation may include a pooling of resources and sharing political responsibility. While the DOD report primarily refers to cooperation with traditional U.S. allies in NATO, the April 1996 Group of Seven (G-7) plus Russia summit on nuclear security and safety issues in Moscow suggests that there is high-level

⁷Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1996), p. 56.

consensus that Russian cooperation is also important.⁸

This thesis recognizes that Americans hold various views on counterproliferation policy, and that there is no agreement on the advisability of conducting joint strategic special operations. This thesis does not attempt to assess the likelihood of success of any specific preemptive strategic special operation. This thesis presumes that, fully cognizant of the risks involved and with due caution, U.S. policymakers may choose to embark on a strategic special operation and may have the opportunity to consider whether it would be more likely to succeed with some form of Russian cooperation. The key assumption is that both Russia and the United States would have exhausted (or dismissed as inadequate) all other non-military (diplomatic, political and economic) options and must resort to a preemptive operation to prevent the employment of a WMD.

C. COALITION IMPLEMENTATION

Russian-American cooperation for emergency response would not necessarily require an integrated standing force. Instead, coalitions could be formed in response to specific threats, with the extent of the cooperation determined by the circumstances. This would be more than an ad hoc coalition as the possibility of cooperation would have been anticipated, and preparations

⁸"Nuclear Security After the Moscow Summit," Strategic Comments, June 1996, pp. 1-3.

(including common training and equipment) would have been made. However, information-sharing regarding sensitive subjects such as the "safing" of nuclear weapons (including permissive action link mechanisms that prevent nuclear devices from detonating) or the properties of other WMD would not occur until so decided by the political leadership as necessary, given the threat.

Russian-American cooperative efforts could reveal to the other side information considered sensitive about the capabilities and vulnerabilities in that area of cooperation. What if this sensitive information fell into the hands of another Stalin, or (from the Russian point of view) another Truman? It must be acknowledged that a return to authoritarian rule in Russia is possible.⁹ Some analysts would argue that if this is possible, the only sensible approach for the United States would be to refrain from cooperation with the Russians, especially with regard to sensitive military matters, or to restrict such cooperation to the greatest degree possible.

A method for handling this difficulty is suggested by examining current Russian-American cooperation in military matters. Tentative bilateral cooperative efforts have begun in

⁹John Keegan, "Who Says a Hitler Could Never Happen Again?" Daily Telegraph, 23 March 1995, p. 18, Nexis, online. The Nexis database does not show the paging within a document; when a page number is given, it refers to the first page on which the document appears in the newspaper or journal.

many counterproliferation-related areas: in the "loose nuke" scenario (a lost or stolen nuclear weapon that might be used in a terrorist incident),¹⁰ in an international law-enforcement training program aimed at nuclear smuggling and terrorism,¹¹ and in a theater missile defense (TMD) exercise.¹² The pattern of proposed cooperation in all cases is similar: the United States assembles a coalition in which Russia is given a limited responsibility in an auxiliary capacity. This thesis analyzes this pattern to assess whether potential Russian-American SOF cooperation in the area of WMD counterproliferation is more likely to succeed than U.S. unilateral action in the same circumstances.

D. STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS

Chapter II examines Russia's potential interest in Russian-American cooperation in dealing with WMD contingencies. There is a range of views in Russia on cooperating with the United States and on the appropriate response to the proliferation of WMD, but

¹⁰John H. Nuckolls, "Post-Cold War Nuclear Dangers: Proliferation and Terrorism," Science, vol. 267 (24 February 1995), p. 1113.

¹¹"Prepared Statement of Ambassador Richard L. Morningstar, Special Adviser to the President and Secretary of State for Assistance to the Newly Independent States, before the House Committee on International Relations," Federal News Service, 13 June 1996, unpagged, Nexis, online.

¹²Robert Holzer, "U.S. Plans Joint Missile-Defense Exercise With Russia," Defense News, 8-14 May 1995, p. 12.

it is possible to conclude that Russia might well be willing to consider a bilateral operation if this was consistent with Russian security interests.

Chapter III analyzes the desirability of Russian-American cooperation in two types of hypothetical WMD contingencies: operations against rogue states and against WMD-armed terrorists. Three types of SOF missions to neutralize WMD facilities or WMD-are terrorists are considered: detection, interdiction, and sabotage. Military criteria and short- and long-term political criteria are examined to determine the likely effectiveness of bilateral cooperation.

Chapter IV considers the feasibility of Russian-American SOF cooperation by looking at three precedents and three models. The precedents include joint peacekeeping, the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and cooperation in the chemical and biological weapons areas. The Russian Spetsnaz model is described to show how Russia might approach dealing with WMD contingencies, although there is doubt as to the current operational effectiveness of the Spetsnaz forces. Two U.S. models are examined: the Nuclear Emergency Search Team and Special Mission Units. The USMC Commandant's Warfighting Lab is discussed as an example of the type of innovative thinking necessary to resolve the command and control difficulties that a bilateral SOF team might face.

Chapter V discusses how to implement cooperation in WMD contingencies. An evolutionary approach similar to the Russian-American experiences with confidence and security-building exercises seems to be most likely to build mutual trust. Chapter VI concludes that the United States and Russia may encounter extraordinary circumstances that would justify preparations to engage in joint strategic special operations.

II. RUSSIAN VIEWS OF WMD PROLIFERATION CHALLENGE

This chapter highlights Russian views of the future security environment that might serve as the basis for developing cooperative approaches with the United States with regard to WMD proliferation contingencies. The most authoritative expression of the Russian government's position is the 1993 Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) Report on Weapons of Mass Destruction.¹³ Russian views concerning the future security environment, including pro-Western and anti-Western perspectives, are reviewed as well. The impact of the conflict in Chechnya may be to promote a shift away from pro-Western views.

A. RUSSIAN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE REPORT ON WMD

While head of the FIS, Yevgeniy Primakov in January 1993 issued a report on the threat that WMD proliferation poses for Russia. The main danger to Russia of the proliferation of WMD is that it "superimposes itself on the development of conflict situations at the regional level."¹⁴ In other words, WMD can intensify and complicate conflicts occurring in areas bordering

¹³Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, A New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, translated by the CIA as JPRS-TND-93-007, dated 5 March 1993.

¹⁴Sergei Nikishov and Sergei Staroselsky, "WMD Proliferation Poses a Major Problem--Primakov," ITAR-TASS, 28 January 1993, unpagged, Nexis, online.

Russia. "Russia is not interested in the emergence of new states possessing weapons of mass destruction along the perimeter of its borders."¹⁵

Vigilance is the most important measure to prevent the emergence of such states. The FIS Report discusses many indications that a state is either developing or has acquired WMD in violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty or other treaties and agreements. This is an assessment activity already being conducted by various national intelligence services; the report suggests that an international system would be preferable. "An effective practical means of counteracting the proliferation of WMD could be the creation and use of a global 'early-warning' system based on scientifically substantiated criteria."¹⁶ According to the FIS, should a violation be detected, the appropriate action would be the imposition of political and economic sanctions on the offending state based on a decision by the United Nations.

Sanctions are an option when sufficient early warning has been obtained. In the event of an unexpected act of terrorism involving the use of WMD, the sponsoring state can expect commensurate retaliation. "Such a terrorist act can be followed

¹⁵Daniel Sneider, "Former KGB Details Nuclear Arms Spread," Christian Science Monitor, 1 February 1993, p. 8, Nexis, online.

¹⁶Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, p. 20.

by 'adequate' retaliatory actions by the 'victimized party' that are now aimed at the state whose citizens allegedly participated in the terrorist act."¹⁷ The FIS report only considers state-sponsored terrorism; it remains unclear how Russia might deal with a non-state terrorist group such as Aum Shinrikyo. The FIS report suggests, however, that Primakov can be expected to support the strengthening of existing nonproliferation regimes and that, in dealing with terrorism, Primakov may support military options.

B. PRO-WESTERN

The 'pro-Western' school is most closely aligned with Western interests and seeks to discourage WMD proliferation; this school represented Russia at the April-May 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty extension conference, among other settings. The most prominent spokesman for this school was Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev, who was ousted from that position in December 1995 in response to increased anti-Western sentiments in Russian society.¹⁸

1. Kozyrev

Andrei Kozyrev was the last Minister of Foreign Affairs of

¹⁷Ibid., p. 3.

¹⁸Alessandra Stanley, "Yeltsin Ushers Out His Foreign Minister," New York Times, 7 January 1996, section 4, p. 2, Nexis, online.

the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic and the first Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, and he was responsible for the creation of its initial pro-Western foreign policy. As this foreign policy matured, Russian security interests began to clash with those in the West. The partnership between Russia and the United States began to resemble "the relations of a married couple whose honeymoon is over and who now have to face their day-to-day life, with all its ups and downs."¹⁹ This moderate sensibility was criticized by increasingly vocal nationalists, and Kozyrev was dismissed by President Yeltsin to improve Yeltsin's popularity in anticipation of the 1996 presidential elections.

2. Karaganov

Supporters of a greater strategic partnership between the United States and Russia gathered in a joint project, which was co-chaired by Fred C. Ikle of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., and Sergei A. Karaganov of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy in Moscow. This project encouraged the most positive appreciation of an effective Russian-American security and defense partnership. "It is highly unlikely that the foreign policy of either Moscow or Washington would, in the future, favor a global U.S.-Russian

¹⁹Andrei Kozyrev, "Partnership or Cold Peace," Foreign Policy, no. 99 (Summer 1995), pp. 8-9.

condominium. On the contrary, the U.S.-Russian security link could become the backbone of a security community encompassing the Northern Hemisphere."²⁰ This sentiment was published in 1993 and may represent a high point in the post-Cold War euphoria.

C. MIXED

At present, nationalist sentiments can be found at every level of Russian society. "Politicians of all stripes talk about the 'specialness' of Russia, of its intrinsic incompatibility with Western models of democracy."²¹ The present foreign policy can be called mixed, for as former Ambassador to Russia Jack Matlock has noted, "Russian foreign policy remains generally consistent with U.S. interests despite occasional outbursts of hostile rhetoric."²² Kozyrev was replaced as Foreign Minister by Yevgeniy Primakov, who was previously head of the Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS), the successor to the KGB. Primakov has long argued that Russia must take a more confrontational approach to the outside world, and his views exemplify the mixed school.

²⁰Fred C. Ikle and Sergei A. Kraganov, Harmonizing the Evolution of U.S. and Russian Defense Policies (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993), p. 11.

²¹Alessandra Stanley, "Stripped of Themes, Yeltsin Wraps Himself in Flag," New York Times, 19 April 1996, p. A3, Nexis, online.

²²Jack F. Matlock, Jr., "Dealing with a Russia in Turmoil," Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 3 (May/June 1996), p. 39.

In an interview published in the Russian newspaper Trud, Primakov outlined three negative trends that Russian foreign policy should counter: the view that Russia lost the Cold War (it should be seen as a universal victory), the creation of a unipolar (U.S.-dominated) world, and Russia being diminished to the status of a source of raw materials.²³ All of these issues deal with the question of status.

The importance of status for Russians can be better understood from a historical and cultural perspective. The typical Russian accepts the new Russian state because he believes that Russians made the sacrifices which created Imperial Russia and the accomplishments of the Soviet Union; the peripheral republics reaped the rewards and were ungrateful at that. Russia should be better off without them, according to this thinking.²⁴ The new Russia emphasizes the greatness of its past, to show Russians that while further sacrifices may be necessary, even greater rewards can be expected in the future. This also serves to show non-Russians the benefits they receive by association.

The difficulty here is that one of the measures of Russia's greatness is the size of its erstwhile empire. Russians often

²³"Foreign Minister Primakov Sets Out Foreign Policy Priorities," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 27 June 1996, unpagd, Nexis, online.

²⁴The most prominent advocate of this position is Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. See his book Rebuilding Russia: Reflections and Tentative Proposals (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1991).

claim special rights in the "near abroad," particularly those areas in which a sizable Russian-speaking minority resides. One foreign policy issue on which there is widespread agreement in Russia is that the expansion of NATO represents a direct threat to Russia and impinges upon Russia's ability to sway events within its self-defined "natural" sphere of influence. The mixed school may demand that its security concerns vis-a-vis NATO be satisfied before it would accept deepened cooperation with the United States.

D. ANTI-WESTERN

The anti-Western forces in Russia are generally extreme nationalists who see threats from the West in many forms, including decadent moral values, the expansion of NATO, and the U.S. nuclear arsenal. These extreme nationalists are for the most part unelected relics of the Soviet era who still run Russia's state machinery. "These nomenklatura nationalists are supported by people in the unreformed parts of the economy--agriculture, coal, and defense--who know they cannot survive unless they go on getting huge state hand-outs."²⁵ The position of these managers is threatened by the economic and political reforms which have followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Western advisors who advocate these reforms are scapegoats

²⁵"The Rise of the New Right," The Economist, 28 January 1995, p. 23.

during this period of turmoil, and the extreme nationalists attempt to discredit reform by attacking the West.

The clearest 'anti-Western' voice is that of Anton Surikov,²⁶ who wrote a paper contending that the United States and its allies should be considered Russia's key potential enemies:

At present, NATO outnumbered Russia two- to three-fold in personnel and conventional arms in Europe. After Poland, Hungary and the former Czechoslovakia (sic) join this military alliance, the gap will increase. In such a situation the only possible solution lies in restraining NATO with nuclear weapons.²⁷

The "anti-Western" school would deliberately disseminate WMD knowledge and materials in response to certain "provocations," such as the expansion of NATO. This "threatened proliferation as a deterrent" could involve reintroducing Russian nuclear weapons into Belarus (which would amount to a redeployment of Russian capabilities rather than an increase in nuclear weapons decision centers), or courting alliances with rogue states by providing them with WMD materials or expertise.

Within the anti-Western school of thought are the

²⁶Surikov is a research fellow at the "independent and highly influential" Institute of Defense Studies in Moscow, according to David Hearst in "Focus/Russia's Rusting Army: Limping Giant Beats a Slow Retreat," The Guardian, 3 February 1996, p. 13, Nexis, online.

²⁷Anton Surikov, "Special Institute Staff Suggests Russia Oppose NATO and the U.S.A.," Segodnya, 20 October 1995, translated by the Conflict Studies Research Centre at Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, England.

nationalist views of the mixed school. The differences are mainly that the anti-Westerners distort these nationalist views into outlooks with little room for compromise. To the degree that the extreme nationalists continue to occupy management positions, they may be able to obstruct cooperative activities with the West within their realm. The mixed school is presently dominant in Russian society, which offers the possibility of increased cooperation in WMD counterproliferation if such cooperation is consistent with Russian national security interests.

E. IMPACT OF CONFLICT IN CHECHNYA

Russia's attention for the moment is focused on its own stability. Chechnya was the first and has been, to date, the most strident territory within the Russian Federation to declare its independence following the breakup of the Soviet Union. The Russian government was distracted by its consolidation efforts, so the region was largely ignored until the implications of Chechnya's drive for independence were declared unacceptable by Moscow. According to Benjamin Lambeth, "Russia's troubling intervention in Chechnya... for all its overkill in concept and ineptitude in execution, was not a manifestation of imperial inclinations but rather a costly and bumbling effort to head off a dangerous precedent that could eventually trigger a

disintegration of the Russian Federation."²⁸ Lacking vital interests in the area, the United States has muted its criticism of this Russian action.

The poor performance of Russian military forces in Chechnya has raised questions about the operational effectiveness of these forces.²⁹ To some military leaders, only Russia's nuclear weapons remain to make sure the West takes Russian security concerns seriously. Calling attention to Russian nuclear forces is Russia's way of insisting that its security concerns on subjects like NATO expansion be taken seriously. As Leszek Buszynski has observed, "the West will have to be patient and firm with Russia and make clear that there are limits to how far it can go to meet Moscow's concerns."³⁰

F. SUMMARY

The present political environment in Russia is more nationalistic than it was during the immediate post-Cold War euphoria. Such nationalism has caused the Russians to limit their cooperation with the West across the board. Some

²⁸Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Russia's Wounded Military," Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, no. 2 (Spring 1995), p. 95.

²⁹Anatol Lieven, "Russia's Military Nadir: The Meaning of the Chechen Debacle," The National Interest, no. 44 (Summer 1996), p. 26.

³⁰Leszek Buszynski, "Russia and the West: Towards Renewed Geopolitical Rivalry?" Survival, vol. 37, no. 3 (Autumn 1995), p. 123.

Americans, having observed this retrenchment, have also cooled their enthusiasm for working with the Russians. Consequently, progress for new initiatives has become glacial. Still, there was a tradition of strong U.S.-Soviet cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation even when the Cold War was at its coldest. This included the establishment of the IAEA and the negotiation of the NPT. This tradition has continued in the post-Soviet period, notably at the 1995 NPT extension conference, a circumstance that offers hope for the expansion and deepening of WMD counterproliferation cooperative efforts.

While both Russian and U.S. theorists have considered the problem of WMD proliferation, each side assesses the problem differently. The asymmetry stems from the fact that the United States is a global superpower, while Russia is not. The new Russian military doctrine clearly states that Russia regards no country as an adversary. "The difference in the countries' assessments of the ramifications of proliferation of WMD and missile delivery means is thus better understood: the United States perceives it as a threat, while Russia perceives it merely as a problem, since Russia is not directly threatened by the missiles of third countries."³¹ Russia is still in the process

³¹Sergei Kortunov, "Russian-American Cooperation on Counterproliferation," The Monitor (Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia), Fall 1995, p. 8. Mr Kortunov is on the staff of Yuri Baturin, the national

of defining its national security interests, and as enemies and allies are identified Russia may rely more explicitly on military power to deter its enemies and protect its allies.

Russians are aware of the dangers of WMD terrorism, which were highlighted by a recent incident in Moscow. Chechen separatists led by one of Chechnya's best-known rebel leaders, Shamil Basayev, buried a box containing radioactive cesium near the entrance to a popular Moscow park as a threat of possible WMD-type future terrorist acts to support the Chechen fight for independence.³² More serious perhaps are the WMD development programs of China, Iraq, Pakistan, India and Iran, countries which lie just beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union.³³ Such circumstances may help persuade the Russians to support international cooperation in dealing with WMD counterproliferation contingencies.

security adviser to the Russian President.

³²Michael Specter, "Chechen Insurgents Take Their Struggle to a Moscow Park," New York Times, 24 November 1995, p. A1.

³³Sherman Garnett, "Russia Ponders Its Nuclear Options," Washington Times, 6 November 1995, p. A25.

III. ANALYSIS OF LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS OF SOF COOPERATION

Given the potentially catastrophic consequences of any WMD employment, this thesis assumes the need for a early and decisive response. The key assumption is that both Russia and the United States would have exhausted (or dismissed as inadequate) all other non-military (diplomatic, political and economic) options before engaging in a preemptive action, recognizing that such preemptive action would be by definition an act of war. Barry R. Schneider has suggested eleven cautionary questions that should be addressed when deciding whether the United States should intervene with military force in any given proliferation situation, such as whether U.S. vital interests are directly threatened and whether surprise is achievable.³⁴ This thesis assumes the answer to all these questions is "yes", and the issue under consideration is whether the operation would have a greater likelihood of success with Russian cooperation.

In order to visualize the types of situations in which a Russian-American SOF force might be called into action, two categories of possible adversaries might be considered: rogue states and WMD-armed terrorists. For these hypothetical WMD

³⁴Barry R. Schneider, Radical Responses to Radical Regimes: Evaluating Preemptive Counter-Proliferation, (Washington, DC: National Defense University, May 1995), pp. 23-26.

contingencies, three types of possible SOF missions are analyzed: detection, interdiction, and sabotage. Criteria are then presented to determine whether these possible SOF missions would be more likely to succeed with Russian cooperation.

A. HYPOTHETICAL WMD CONTINGENCIES

At present, leading candidates for classification as rogue states are Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea.³⁵ This thesis examines the case of Iran for illustrative purposes only, not to imply that it is a likely prospect for joint Russian-American operations. Iran supports insurgents against the Russian-backed regime in Tajikistan as well as threatening U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf. These circumstances might help to make Iran the scene of some sort of cooperative counterproliferation operation. Among non-state actors, this thesis proposes for analysis a hypothetical WMD-armed terrorist who directly targets U.S. interests and whose source of WMD is the former Soviet arsenal, ostensibly under Russian control. To maintain control over its WMD arsenal, Russia could be expected to cooperate in recovering Russian assets acquired by terrorists.

1. Rogue States

Iran's growing military capabilities have been the focus of U.S. concern. "A fresh U.S. warning about Iran's military

³⁵Barry R. Schneider, pp. 6-7.

program came ... from the commander-in-chief of the U.S. Central Command, who said that the pace of Tehran's recent modernization efforts in naval capabilities, missile acquisition and weapons of mass destruction far exceeded its defense needs."³⁶ In June 1995, the United States imposed a trade and investment ban on Iran, in view of Iran's efforts to foster terrorism and develop nuclear weapons.

During the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam Hussein repeatedly tried to destroy the Iranian nuclear reactor at Bushehr. Seven air strikes eventually destroyed most of the known Iranian capability to produce special nuclear materials.³⁷ Despite strong objections from the United States, the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy has signed a contract to rebuild the damaged structures and install a Russian reactor.³⁸

A reconstructed Bushehr reactor might not present a key and fragile target. After Israel's 1981 bombing of Iraq's Osirak reactor, Hussein chose several less vulnerable alternative paths to developing WMD. Iran can be expected to have profited from Iraq's experience in the Gulf War, and has probably attempted to

³⁶"Israeli, U.S. or Joint Strike Against Iran Seems Just a Matter of Time," Mideast Mirror (U.K.), 24 May 1996, p. 2, Nexis, online.

³⁷Barry R. Schneider, p. 15.

³⁸"Russians to Begin Nuclear Complex in Iran," New York Times, 21 August 1995, p. A2, Nexis, online.

conceal efforts to develop WMD.³⁹ Iran would have other secret and well-fortified installations if indeed it is attempting to develop nuclear weapons and other WMD.

Because the United States lacks diplomatic relations with Iran and has banned business-related contacts, U.S. opportunities to collect information on Iranian intentions and on installations not observable by national technical means are limited. Russia has both diplomatic relations and pertinent business contacts with Iran, and could be a valuable source of information about Iranian intentions and secret installations. One plausible linkage for providing this information to the United States might be related to the conflict in Tajikistan.

Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, militant Islamic fundamentalists supported by Iran attacked the pro-Moscow government of President Rakhmon Nabyev. Russia intervened under the pretext of protecting non-Tajiks in the republic, with the assistance of token forces from other Central Asian states that feared that instability in Tajikistan could spread. According to Mark Galeotti, "with around 20,000 Russian troops in-country though, Moscow is clearly in control, and here 'peacekeeping' really means supporting a friendly government - indeed, some have

³⁹For an elaboration, see David A. Kay, "Denial and Deception Practices of WMD Proliferators: Iraq and Beyond" in Brad Roberts, ed., Weapons Proliferation in the 1990s (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1995), pp. 305-325.

characterized it as little more than a puppet regime - against rebels whose activities could undermine regional stability and the underpinnings of Russian security on its southern borders."⁴⁰

Russian intervention here is on such a scale that the independence of Tajikistan is nominal and Russian troops are likely to be needed indefinitely. Russian troops are in Tajikistan for several reasons, including to intercept assistance to insurgents via Afghanistan from Iran. The Russian sale of nuclear technology to Iran might be looked at not only as a financial transaction but also as important for neutralizing the threat of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia by lessening Iranian support to insurgents. An increase of Iranian pressure in Tajikistan might prompt Russia to be less friendly with Iran and more amenable to supplying intelligence or otherwise cooperating with the United States.

2. WMD-Armed Terrorists

This thesis uses the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo as its model of a hypothetical WMD-armed terrorist that directly targets U.S. interests and whose source of WMD is the former Soviet arsenal under Russian control. The cult made extensive efforts to buy materials for nuclear and chemical weapons from Russia.

⁴⁰Mark Galeotti, "Russia and Eurasia: Out-of-Area Operations and Peacekeeping," Jane's Intelligence Review, 31 December 1994, p. 35.

Given the sad state of Russian inventory control, this could easily be done surreptitiously. According to Michael Gordon, "Russia has no way of knowing for sure if any of its vast supply of bomb ingredients is missing, many of its own nuclear officials and scientists admit."⁴¹ According to Senator Sam Nunn (D-Georgia), the ability of the cult to acquire and manufacture WMD makes it "a prime example of what I believe to be our greatest national security concern in the years ahead."⁴²

One difference between a rogue state and a WMD-armed terrorist is the relative ease with which they can acquire WMD. Iran could be presumed to be developing a variety of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons with the resources of the country at its disposal, while a terrorist might be limited to a small quantity of one type of WMD. It is useful to consider the implications if the choice is nuclear, chemical, or biological.

a. Nuclear Terrorism

Nuclear terrorism could take many forms. According to Karl-Heinz Kamp, "they range from the actual detonation of nuclear weapons or acts of nuclear violence, for example, in the form of the release of radioactive substances or the radioactive

⁴¹Michael R. Gordon, "Russian Controls on Bomb Material are Leaky," New York Times, 18 August 1994, p. A1, Nexis, online.

⁴²Cited in Christopher Drew, "Japanese Sect Tried to Buy U.S. Arms Technology, Senator Says," New York Times, 31 October 1995, p. A5, Nexis, online.

contamination of drinking water, to acts of sabotage in and against nuclear power plants."⁴³ Detonation has been regarded as the least likely form of nuclear terrorism, due to the hurdle of manufacturing a nuclear device; obtaining an intact device from the former Soviet arsenal could increase the likelihood of such terrorism. This hypothetical nuclear scenario assumes that a Russian nuclear weapon is on board a ship in the harbor of a U.S. city.⁴⁴ A traditional NEST might be employed against this threat, possibly assisted by Russia with intelligence on the terrorist or details on the device.

b. Chemical Terrorism

Of the three categories of WMD, chemical weapons may be the most likely to be used. The dual-use (military and commercial) potential of many chemicals makes them readily available to terrorists. According to the Office of Technology Assessment, "although well-equipped troops can defend themselves against existing chemical agents with detectors, decontamination equipment, gas masks, and protective garments (albeit at some cost in military effectiveness), chemical weapons can still have

⁴³Karl-Heinz Kamp, "Nuclear Terrorism--Facts and Fiction," unpublished manuscript, p. 3.

⁴⁴Taken from Uwe Nerlich, The Political and Strategic Analysis of Nuclear Non-state Actors and Sponsoring States: What to Look for? (Sandia National Laboratories, August 1994), pp. 22-23.

devastating effects when employed against defenseless civilians."⁴⁵ This hypothetical chemical scenario begins with an unemployed Russian chemist advising a terrorist group on the manufacture of a poison gas to be released during the summer 1996 Olympics in Atlanta.⁴⁶ An NBC-EST might be employed against this threat, possibly assisted by Russia in the form of intelligence on the terrorist or on the expertise of the chemist.

c. Biological Terrorism

Biological weapons pose potentially greater dangers than either chemical or nuclear weapons because they are so lethal on a pound-for-pound basis, their production requires a much smaller and cheaper industrial infrastructure, and the necessary technology and know-how are almost entirely dual-use.⁴⁷ Technical factors relating to the difficulty of handling substances of such lethality may have prevented terrorists from employing biological weapons to date, but prudence dictates preparedness for the possibility in the future. In this hypothetical scenario, an unemployed Russian biologist advises a

⁴⁵U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1993), p. 15.

⁴⁶Based on Marc Rice, "Atlanta to Simulate Tokyo Subway Attack for Olympic Drill," Associated Press Online, 11 January 1996, unpagged, Nexis, online.

⁴⁷U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, p. 73.

terrorist on the fermentation of anthrax spores which could be dispersed over New York City.⁴⁸ An NBC-EST might be employed against this threat, possibly assisted by Russia in the form of intelligence on the terrorist or on the specialization of the biologist.

B. TYPES OF SOF MISSIONS

Three types of SOF missions could be employed in a WMD scenario. Detection is the search for WMD, both for its location and for its characteristics. Interdiction is the seizure and disablement or destruction of WMD. Sabotage refers to those actions which would prevent an adversary from manufacturing a WMD. Each of these missions might be attempted in the above hypothetical WMD contingencies.

1. Detection

Detection goes beyond the sharing of intelligence about the adversary. Cooperation on the level of information-sharing has to be presumed before a cooperative action can be considered. According to Jeffrey Simon, "governments are more willing to cooperate in information-sharing than in other counterterrorist measures, since counterterrorist intelligence can be done 'quietly,' without fanfare and without the risks involved in

⁴⁸Based on Robert H. Kupperman and David M. Smith, "Coping with Biological Terrorism," in Brad Roberts, ed., Biological Weapons: Weapons of the Future? (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), pp. 41-43.

other types of joint antiterrorist ventures."⁴⁹ For action against the terrorist armed with WMD materials obtained from Russian sources, however, Russia would have to transfer highly sensitive information concerning its own WMD arsenals and the security systems which surround them. Even though the United States and Russia currently enjoy good relations, a change in the Russian political leadership could rapidly reverse this. The Russians might fear that previously provided information could be used to the detriment of Russian security interests.

Vital yet sensitive information might be subject to misinterpretation in the detection phase of the counterterrorist operation, because the information release process might hamper the flow of communications. For this reason, the sides might benefit from an exchange of liaison officers to provide an immediate capability to clarify what information is needed or the meaning of the information provided. If properly trained, liaison officers could help overcome some of the cultural barriers which create misunderstandings. For example, building a close relationship with the Russians could allow for communication exchanges that would not otherwise take place. Americans tend, however, frequently to rotate in and out of

⁴⁹Jeffrey D. Simon, U.S. Countermeasures Against International Terrorism (RAND Publication R-3840-C3I, 1990), p. v.

positions, a practice which hampers continuity in working relationships. While cultural differences may seem to be obstacles to effective cooperation, at the working level both nations' military forces can have pride in their units and capabilities. Given a common task, soldiers in the field could be expected to devise whatever shortcuts or expedients might be necessary to improve cooperation so that the mission is accomplished.

One shortcut that would increase Russian-American cooperation but that would not require the integration of forces would be to divide the search area into separate zones. A simple model of this expedient can be seen in the planning for a Russian-U.S. theater missile defense (TMD) command post exercise (CPX) held 3-7 June 1996 at the Joint National Test Facility (JNTF) at Falcon AFB, Colorado.⁵⁰ In the exercise scenario, a fictional third country asked for protection from an adversary's short-range ballistic missiles. Russia and the United States agreed to defend this country not by integrating their capabilities, but rather by dividing the country into zones which each would defend with its own forces and equipment. It is simpler not to integrate the forces, but this arrangement

⁵⁰Charles Aldinger, "U.S., Russian Troops Set Missile Exercise," Reuters World Service, 25 April 1996, unpagged, Nexis, online.

increases the demands on the coalition leadership to trust the other side.

The implications of the exercise scenario are that the Russian "zone" in WMD counterproliferation might be the territory of the Russian Federation and possibly the "near abroad" consisting of former Soviet Republics; the U.S. "zone" would be the rest of the world. Cooperation would follow the model of the TMD exercise: the forces would work separately but to a common purpose. Sharing intelligence and planning information is the primary operational question. Intelligence about an adversary's intentions is particularly useful.

Human intelligence might be the best method of gaining information about intentions. Recruiting and maintaining agents in locations where they can gather useful information is a delicate and difficult endeavor. According to Tim Weiner, "American spies overseas are almost all based in embassies, posing as diplomats and targeting their opposite numbers. But the United States has no embassies in Iran, Iraq or North Korea. And most terrorists, weapons dealers and drug kingpins do not wear white tie and tails."⁵¹ The effectiveness of American foreign spy recruitment efforts is periodically questioned during

⁵¹Tim Weiner, "The CIA's most Important Mission: Itself," New York Times Sunday Magazine, 10 December 1995, p. 62, Nexis, online.

scandals, such as occurred in February 1996 when five Americans in Paris were accused of trying to bribe French government officials.⁵² Coming on top of the Ames uproar, many Members of Congress began to question the utility of even trying to recruit foreign spies, preferring to rely on American technology and open source information as less likely to give rise to scandal.

Human intelligence may be an area in which Russia possesses a relative advantage over the United States, such that Russian cooperation could help overcome U.S. intelligence deficiencies. William Casey, CIA director under President Reagan, well understood the importance of recruiting foreign spies: he is credited with recruiting 200 agents against Nazi Germany. As Casey wrote in The Secret War Against Hitler (a posthumously published chronicle of his wartime experiences), "I believe that it is important today to understand how clandestine intelligence, covert action, and organized resistance saved blood and treasure in defeating Hitler."⁵³ The common task today is to apply these same methods to identify WMD-armed rogue states and terrorists and their weaknesses.

⁵²Tim Weiner, "CIA Confirms Blunders During Economic Spying on France," New York Times, 13 March 1996, p. A10, Nexis, online.

⁵³William Casey, The Secret War Against Hitler (Washington, DC: Regnery, 1988), p. xiv.

2. Interdiction

This thesis assumes that it would be relatively simpler for Russians to interdict WMD on or near their territory than for the United States to attempt to carry out the same operation unilaterally in that area. In the hypothetical scenario involving Iran, military activity could face conditions similar to those in neighboring Afghanistan, where Russia has a great deal of experience. Logistically and operationally, and in terms of intelligence support, the chances of success of a preemptive strike against Iran's WMD capabilities would be enhanced by Russian cooperation.

Russian response force members would probably include soldiers who share a common language, ethnic and cultural traits and religious beliefs with military personnel in the area of operations. These soldiers could be more easily assimilated and hidden in the area of operations if necessary.⁵⁴ If political considerations precluded the employment of U.S. response forces, Russian troops might be able to seize and disable or destroy WMD to both countries' benefit.

The goal of catching the WMD proliferant off guard would likely be met the first time it was attempted. William McRaven states that a necessary condition for the success of a special

⁵⁴Adapted from Lt. Col. Robert D. Lewis, "SOF Planning for Coalition Operations," Special Warfare, October 1994, p. 29.

operations mission is the achievement of relative superiority over the adversary.⁵⁵ An adversary may believe that it has anticipated the reaction of one country or the other, but not both combined, giving the interdiction force this relative superiority. As with airline hijackers, rogue states and terrorists could be expected to learn from the experiences of others, a circumstance that could lessen the future advantages of Russian-American cooperation as the details became known.⁵⁶

McRaven describes simplicity as the most crucial principle in achieving relative superiority, and defines the term as limiting the number of objectives, good intelligence, and innovation. "Sharing the load" by inviting coalition participation is a method of making the number of objectives manageable. Improved intelligence should result from pooling the available resources. Innovation would result from the use of new technology and from working as a coalition. This overview of McRaven's theory of special operations suggests that there may be circumstances in which bilateral cooperation would be superior to a unilateral operation. Lucien S. Vandenbroucke cautions, however, that this may not be the case.

⁵⁵William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare, Theory and Practice (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1995), pp. 4-23.

⁵⁶James Adams, "Handcuffing Hostage Rescuers; The Hijackers Have Learned the Lessons of Mogadishu," The Washington Post, 17 April 1988, p. C5, Nexis, online.

Vandenbroucke has identified several reasons for the likely failure of strategic special operations. These reasons are faulty intelligence; insufficient coordination and cooperation between the services and agencies involved; poor information and advice, often presented to senior decision makers; wishful thinking; and excessive control over mission execution by senior military or civilian officials far from the theater of operations.⁵⁷ These causes of failure might be doubly likely to arise in a bilateral Russian-American operation. Partial access to a second intelligence stream might not, for example, convince decision makers to change their assumptions. The problems of coordination would be magnified in dealing with another bureaucratic structure. While a bilateral operation would have to incorporate a second opinion, there is no guarantee that both would not "become insidiously attracted to strategic operations, to the point of engaging in wishful thinking, in which hopes distort perception and wishes are mistaken for reality."⁵⁸ One need only reflect on Russian actions in Chechnya or on U.S. failures (such as Desert One during the Carter administration) to realize that two heads may not be better than one.

⁵⁷Vandenbroucke, pp. 152-69.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 7.

3. Sabotage

Sabotage can be distinguished from interdiction in that its methodology is usually clandestine. An example is the 1990 destruction by fire of the Libyan chemical weapons plant at Rabta, which Libya has blamed on U.S. and/or Israeli agents, charges both have denied.⁵⁹ As the United States may be considering a preemptive strike against Libya's replacement underground chemical weapons facility at Tarhunah,⁶⁰ it could be useful to consider the possibility of a clandestine Russian-American strike against WMD in Libya or Iran.

The success of a clandestine mission would depend on security and trust. U.S. confidence in the Russian ability to maintain operational security might be low--and vice-versa. One mechanism for improving security would be to pass sensitive information only when required by the circumstances; this could, however, create an information bottleneck, which might slow decision making. The bottleneck would not result from the need to totally declassify information in order for it to be exchanged. For example, the United States has treated as classified Soviet and Russian nuclear weapons inventory

⁵⁹"Stop Libya Without Nukes," The Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 26 April 1996, p. 18A, Nexis, online.

⁶⁰"Libya's Chemical Threat May Force U.S. to Strike," USA Today, 9 May 1996, p. 14A, Nexis, online.

information since at least 1969, when the SALT negotiations began.

Russian defense decision making is dependent on the willingness of key individuals to become personally involved in the implementation of a new program. A historical study of a coalition of unequal partners (France and Russia during World War I) concluded that "the proper functioning of coalitions depends on the personal relations of the commanders in the field who were called upon to enact mutual cooperation."⁶¹ Much of the success of the CTR program in improving Russian nuclear weapons storage security has depended on the involvement of Russian 3-star General Yevgeniy Maslin, head of the Russian Ministry of Defense's 12th Main Directorate, which has responsibility for the security of the Strategic Rocket Forces.⁶² More recently, it took four meetings in 1995 between Russian Minister of Defense Grachev and U.S. Defense Secretary Perry to secure Russian agreement to participate in the Dayton Peace Accord's Implementation Force. The willingness of Secretary Perry and other U.S. officials to work with the Russians on this basis is

⁶¹Jehuda L. Wallach, Uneasy Coalition: The Entente Experience in World War I, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1993), p. 4.

⁶²"Prepared Testimony of Dr. Ashton B. Carter, Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy, for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee," Federal News Service, 4 October 1994, unpagged, Nexis, online.

to some degree dependent on their personalities. Other officials may be less accommodating or may have other priorities.

C. CRITERIA FOR EFFECTIVE SOF MISSIONS

Three sets of criteria can be proposed to determine how Russian cooperation in a WMD counterproliferation contingency might create a greater likelihood of success for the operation. Military criteria examine Russian preparedness to contribute to an operation. Short-term political criteria emphasize the avoidance of scandal. Long-term political criteria concern strategic motives for seeking Russian participation even in the face of shortcomings in the military and short-term areas.

1. Military Criteria

After Chechnya, the operational reliability of the Russian military is certainly open to question. "Nearly every aspect of military activity--from training, supply, coordination among services, strategy, tactics, morale, and fighting spirit--failed the test of battle."⁶³ This judgement also applies to Russian elite special forces units, as was seen in the debacle at Pervomayskoye in January 1996, when approximately 75 Chechen insurgents escaped encirclement by over 1000 of these "spetsnaz"

⁶³Timothy L. Thomas, "Fault Lines and Factions in the Russian Army, Orbis, vol. 39, no. 4 (Fall 1995), p. 531.

forces.⁶⁴ Given such deficiencies, the utility of including the Russian military in a preemptive counterproliferation strike in any role more active than information-sharing seems dubious--at least until military reforms have taken hold.

2. Short-Term Political Criteria

The question of the political costs, in both Moscow and Washington, of the United States being part of a *failed* NBC-EST response must be acknowledged. Cooperation limited to information-sharing through classified communications links could more easily be kept confidential than the presence of advisors from another country. Keeping such a foreign presence out of the public eye might be particularly important in the event of setbacks.

A partially analogous situation arose with the involvement of the British Special Air Service (SAS) at Waco. The 1995 House hearings on the 1993 Waco tragedy revealed the involvement of both U.S. and British military forces in the decision-making process that ended the siege. Two Delta Force commando unit commanders consulted with Attorney General Janet Reno. This was appropriate in that the Delta Force specializes in anti-terrorist and hostage-rescue operations, but sensitive, because federal law prohibits the military from direct participation in civil law

⁶⁴"Russia's Rotten Army," Jane's Intelligence Review, March 1996, p. 99.

enforcement.⁶⁵ It was, however, surprising that two British SAS "observers" were also invited to the scene, even though the SAS forces have a notorious reputation in Ireland and among Irish-Americans for their conduct in policing Northern Ireland.⁶⁶

Congressman Peter King, R-NY, publicized this fact, asking why a foreign military force, with what he called "a disgraceful human rights record," was advising the FBI.⁶⁷ This reaction is mild compared to what might be said in Russia should a debacle involving American assistance occur. A debacle that could be blamed on the Americans--no matter how unfairly--could lead to a violent anti-American reaction, depending on the circumstances.

3. Long-Term Political Criteria

While the short-term goal of avoidance of scandal cannot be ignored, there are long-term political motives for trying to obtain Russian cooperation in a coalition for WMD counterproliferation contingencies. Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison Taw emphasize that governments faced with terrorism must have a comprehensive national plan which includes the following elements: effective overall command and coordination; effective

⁶⁵Kirk Spitzer, "Lawmakers Held Classified Meeting About Waco with Army Commandos," Gannet News Service, 31 July 1995, Nexis, online.

⁶⁶Dave Eisenstadt, "GOP-ers Rip Brit Help at Siege," (New York) Daily News, 1 August 1995, p. 16, Nexis, online.

⁶⁷"SAS had Aided FBI on Waco Siege, Hearing is Told," The Irish Times, 2 August 1995, p. 7, Nexis, online.

antiterrorist legislation combined with measures to build public trust and support; coordination within and between intelligence services; and collaboration with foreign governments and security forces.⁶⁸

Hoffman and Taw conclude that foreign collaboration "is capricious, depending completely on the individual political and economic interests of the countries involved and, to a lesser extent, on the personalities and relationships between political leaders as well as senior police, military, and security service personnel."⁶⁹ To reduce capriciousness, collaboration must be based on shared interests. To the degree that the problem of WMD proliferation arises from leakage from Russia, the collaboration of the Russian Federation may be critical to aid detection and interdiction, but international cooperation may also help Russia maintain control over its WMD assets.

WMD counterproliferation may require protracted campaigns involving vigilance of indefinite duration against rogue states and terrorists. A change in regime may close a chapter on a specific rogue state, but against terrorism there will probably be many battles without any final victory. The elimination of one terrorist may require tremendous energy and treasure yet will

⁶⁸Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison Taw, A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency (RAND Note N-3506-DOS, 1992), p. v.

⁶⁹Hoffman and Taw, p. 127.

not suffice. According to Jeffrey Simon,

Progress will be achieved at times, periodic arrests of terrorists will be made, bombs will be detected and plots uncovered, support for terrorist activity will be temporarily suspended by certain states, and governments will cooperate to varying degrees in antiterrorist efforts. But terrorists will always have an advantage, since a single incident at the right time can lead to a perception that no progress has been made in the fight against terrorism.⁷⁰

Maintaining support in both Russia and the United States for a protracted coalition campaign would be a challenging leadership problem. Governments and militaries prefer unilateral action and control. Coalition arrangements are usually created to deal with a threat too big for one nation to stand against, but the term coalition usually refers to a temporary arrangement. (The term alliance often refers to a long term arrangement.)⁷¹ This thesis has considered how Russia and the United States might join together for particular operations in WMD counterproliferation; present political realities do not allow for consideration of an alliance between the two countries.

D. SUMMARY

Information-sharing is the most likely form of Russian-American cooperation in these hypothetical WMD contingencies. Timely and accurate information from Russia would improve the

⁷⁰Simon, p. 39.

⁷¹Martha Maurer, Coalition Command and Control (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1994), p. 9.

chances for success of any operation against rogue states or WMD-armed terrorists. The information likely to be passed would reveal sensitive details about the capabilities and weaknesses of Russian WMD materials and safeguarding methods. The willingness of Russia to pass such information would depend on an assessment that the planned operation is in Russia's national interest.

The ability of Russian Spetsnaz forces (or their successors) to contribute in a positive way to the SOF missions of detection, interdiction and sabotage is questionable. The possibility exists that, as military reforms continue in Russia, this situation could improve and more active roles could be found for Russian special forces. The decision to include more active participation would depend on a mutual willingness to take the risk of suffering short-term recriminations from critics as part of a long-term strategy against WMD proliferation.

IV. MODELS FOR SOF COOPERATION IN WMD COUNTERPROLIFERATION

In its search for the most effective methods of dealing with WMD counterproliferation contingencies, the United States may consider soliciting the assistance of Russia. This assistance would have several precedents, including joint peacekeeping, the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and the DOE Lab-to-Lab Initiative. Cooperation in nuclear areas has not been matched in chemical or biological areas. Russian models for operations involving WMD counterproliferation probably derive from the Soviet Spetsnaz forces. U.S. models include the Nuclear Emergency Search Team and U.S. Special Operations Command Special Mission Units. Command and control of a Russian-American response force would demand the use of modern communications technology and creative operational planning and tactics, such as suggested by the USMC Commandant's Warfighting Lab.

A. PRECEDENTS

1. Joint Peacekeeping

Russian views of the future security environment throw light on current Russian military activities. The evidence from ongoing activities demonstrates that Russia is willing to enforce its claims on some of the other former Soviet republics, and that to a large degree the United States has acquiesced to this arrangement. To a high degree within the former Soviet Union and

to a lesser degree in the former Warsaw Pact countries, Russia has repeatedly argued that its security interests must take precedence; for this reason Russia has resisted NATO expansion to the east and international scrutiny of its "peacekeeping" efforts within the former Soviet Union. Under the rubric of peacekeeping, sizable Russian forces have been dispatched to Georgia, Tajikistan, and Chechnya.

These extensive activities color Russian perceptions of U.S. peacekeeping operations. For example, many Russians consider American recourse to the United Nations simply a cover in the same manner that Russia sometimes chooses a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) cover or even U.N. involvement, judging that these are useful methods of accomplishing national strategic purposes. Russia does not accept humanitarianism as a goal in itself, in contrast with the manner in which the U.S. presents its involvement in Bosnia.

Since the Cold War ended, the United States has been involved in Kuwait, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and Bosnia. According to Bob Deans, "in each case, it took U.S. soldiers to turn back aggression, prop up democracy, restore order or simply staunch the bloodshed. It is a costly and perhaps politically unsustainable pattern, putting American treasure and thousands of

American lives at risk."⁷² The alternative to this pattern is an emerging doctrine called "preventive defense," with the aim of keeping dangerous situations from becoming military threats to the United States.⁷³ The ideal is preventive crisis management; the counter-argument is that it seems there must be a crisis before the U.S. government can be mobilized to do anything.

The post-cold war pattern is for the United States to lead a multinational coalition, as in the case of Haiti. Through the mechanism of "dual-hatting" U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Joseph Kinzer was the commander of both the U.N. Mission in Haiti and the Commander of U.S. Forces Haiti.⁷⁴ This blueprint was incorporated into the planning of U.S.-led multinational peacekeeping exercises such as "Cooperative Nugget 95," which was held in August 1995 at Fort Polk, Louisiana. This was the first exercise on U.S. soil involving 14 formerly communist nations, with Russia notably absent. "Cooperative Nugget 95" used the fictional scenario of a border conflict between two countries, leading to the dispatch of an international force charged with peacekeeping. The exercise was aimed at teaching the soldiers from the various countries how

⁷²Bob Deans, "Stopping Wars Before They Occur," The Atlanta Constitution, 31 March 1996, p. 9.

⁷³William J. Perry, "U.S. Security Policy Stresses Prevention, Deterrence," USIA Wireless File, 6 March 1996, p. 15.

⁷⁴Robert B. Killebrew and David H. Petraeus, "Winning the Peace: Haiti, the U.S. and the UN," Armed Forces Journal International, April 1995, p. 40.

to cooperate and communicate despite different languages, and how to establish command posts.⁷⁵

Russia refused to participate in an exercise that would have placed it on the same basis as the East Europeans, because the Russians still view themselves as a global power. Russia did agree to participate in bilateral exercises at Ft Riley, Kansas, in November 1995. These bilateral exercises were viewed as reciprocation for the "Peacekeeper 94" exercises held a year before in Russia at Totskoye. The exercises at Totskoye were the first involving U.S. soldiers on Russian soil. The United States recognized that "Peacekeeper 94" was more a symbolic breaking down of the Iron Curtain than serious military training. "In the future, the American and Russian armies would like to draw up regulations on joint armed peacekeeping operations for higher-level staffs, since the Totskoye exercises were held at the level of joint patrols or checkpoints, for the most part."⁷⁶ The exercises did set a precedent for Russian participation in the U.S.-led Bosnian Peace Implementation Force (IFOR).

Bosnia is at the limits of the Russian sphere of interest.

⁷⁵Emmanuel Serot, "First Eastern European Exercise on U.S. Soil," Agence France Presse (wire service), 7 August 1995, unpaginated, Nexis, online.

⁷⁶Pavel Felgengauer, "Friendship: Russians and Americans Liked Holding Maneuvers Together," Sevodnya, 8 September 1994, p. 2; translated in the Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 5 October 1994, p. 24.

Despite the severe economic difficulties in Russia and Russian military commitments elsewhere, Russia wanted to participate in the implementation of the Dayton agreements to demonstrate that it is still a regional power, but for domestic political reasons could not agree to have its forces subordinate to NATO. It was acceptable, however, to place Russian forces under U.S. command, and U.S. Secretary of Defense Perry and Russian Minister of Defense Grachev agreed on Russian participation in the Dayton Peace Agreement IFOR. The Russian contingent would be commanded by an American general, Supreme Allied Commander Europe George Joulwan, and his deputy would be Colonel-General Leonty Shevtsov, deputy director of the Russian General Staff's Chief Operations Administration and former commander of the first three months of operations in Chechnya. According to Russian journalist Ilya Bulavinov, "at first glance the agreement seems ... questionable (it is very difficult to distinguish between the concepts of 'American general' and 'commander in chief of NATO forces'), but the accord is valuable to Moscow in that the United States had agreed to Russian participation in all aspects of the peacekeeping operation."⁷⁷ The Pentagon had initially insisted that the Russians perform auxiliary functions (engineering work,

⁷⁷Ilya Bulavinov, "It's Easier to Reach Agreement in the Field," Kommersant-Daily, 31 October 1995, p. 1; translated in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 29 November 1995, p. 27.

mine clearing, and construction) but not participate in military operations per se, such as separating the former belligerents and taking up positions in certain sectors.

According to General Joulwan, the Dayton peace accord has resulted in the most significant military and political cooperation with Russia since World War II: "This joint NATO-Russian mission proves that the two former adversaries can achieve peaceful goals through military cooperation. It has also widened mutual understanding and trust...a direct result and a natural result of a common mission. This cooperation can become an enduring framework for partnership into the next century."⁷⁸ One hoped-for outcome is that Moscow will see how the Alliance operates and soften its opposition to NATO's enlargement.

2. Cooperative Threat Reduction Program

The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, controlled by the Department of Defense (DOD), has been the Clinton administration's principal tool for working with the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union to improve nuclear security.⁷⁹ Initially the program dealt with improving

⁷⁸George A. Joulwan, "When Ivan Meets GI Joe," Washington Post, 28 April 1996, p. C3.

⁷⁹Jessica E. Stern, "U.S. Assistance Programs for Improving MPC&A (Material Protection, Control, and Accounting) in the Former Soviet Union," The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 3, no. 2 (Winter 1996), p. 22.

nuclear weapon transportation security by providing 'armored blankets,' special transportation canisters, emergency response vehicles, and rail cars designed to test rail bed stability (the Russian practice is to transport nuclear weapons by train). In 1993, the program expanded to include fissile material security at storage sites, production facilities, and laboratories.

Given the scale of the WMD proliferation threat potential in the former Soviet Union, only a government-to-government program of the magnitude of CTR is likely to have sufficient resources to make a difference in reducing the amount of WMD materials and the danger of their diversion. It appears, however, that the Russians are generally dissatisfied with this program because (from a Russian perspective) the funds are spent in an inefficient fashion in the United States.⁸⁰ Under CTR, no funds are provided directly to Russians, only equipment and expertise contracted for in the United States. In fiscal year 1996, overall funding has suffered together with the budget for foreign aid. CTR has nonetheless set many precedents for Russian-American cooperation and has increased the level of common training and the quantity of equipment related to WMD

⁸⁰"Testimony of Constantine C. Menges, Director, Program on Transitions to Democracy, Elliot School of International Affairs, the George Washington University, Before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Foreign Operations Subcommittee," Federal News Service, 16 May 1996, Nexis, online.

counterproliferation.

3. Lab-to-Lab Initiative

The DOE Lab-to-Lab initiative is more directly relevant to the possibility of increased WMD counterproliferation cooperation. A survey of counterproliferation collaboration between Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Arzamas-16, a Russian nuclear weapons laboratory, showed that LANL provided equipment and training to improve Russian response capabilities to deal with accidents involving nuclear weapons.⁸¹ A pilot demonstration project using off-the-shelf intrusion sensors was recently carried out at the Kurchatov nuclear laboratory in Moscow and at the Argonne National Laboratory. If the intrusion sensors detect activity within a vault used for storing weapon pits, a video camera is automatically tripped, and images are retrieved on demand via telephone lines in Russia and the United States.⁸² These projects, although smaller in scale than those under CTR, provide common training and equipment and lay a foundation for a bilateral capability in WMD counterproliferation contingencies.

⁸¹"U.S. and Russian Scientists Practice Softly," International Defense Review, no. 27 (October 1994), p. 42.

⁸²"DOE, Russians Present Low-Cost System for Checking Nuclear Material," Inside Energy, 10 April 1995, unpagged, Nexis, online.

4. Chemical and Biological Weapons

Cooperation in joint peacekeeping and CTR has not been matched in the chemical and biological weapons fields. "Russian President Boris Yeltsin and other top leaders appear committed to abolishing such weapons, the administration said in an interagency report, but bureaucratic infighting, shortages of funds and some residual resistance among lower-level officials have left sensitive issues unresolved and blocked some data exchanges."⁸³ The United States has been more open than Russia about its chemical weapons programs, unilaterally revealing the amount and types of its chemical weapons in storage.⁸⁴

B. RUSSIAN MODELS

Russian special forces which could be employed in WMD contingencies are generally known by the Russian composite word "spetsnaz," meaning special purpose. Russian Spetsnaz troops are a legacy of the Soviet Army's concern with the West's deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in the 1950's.⁸⁵ Soviet Spetsnaz troops were trained to go behind enemy lines to locate these

⁸³Thomas W. Lippman, "Administration Voices Concern on Russian Treaty Compliance; Congress Told Moscow's Chemical, Germ Weapon Plans Are Suspect," Washington Post, 11 December 1994, p. A36.

⁸⁴"Army Exposes Chemical Secret," Associated Press Online, 22 January 1996, unpagged, Nexis, online.

⁸⁵Viktor Suvorov, Spetsnaz: The Inside Story of the Soviet Special Forces (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1987), p. 5.

nuclear weapons and destroy them. Additional targets included command, control and communications elements and key logistic centers.⁸⁶

These military reconnaissance commandos were subordinate to the Soviet Army General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU).⁸⁷ Police commandos for riot control, usually known by the Russian acronym "OMON," were subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), while commandos whose missions included sabotage and assassination were subordinate to the KGB. Following the break-up of the USSR, the budget for the Russian armed forces has nearly collapsed, while greater resources have gone to the MVD to deal with internal unrest as in Chechnya and to the KGB successor organizations to deal with organized crime.⁸⁸ One reason for this shift may be that President Yeltsin suspects the regular Army of disloyalty to himself and prefers to shift resources to the other security services.⁸⁹ At present, the MVD may have the best capabilities to deal with terrorism,

⁸⁶A listing of Soviet Spetsnaz targets can be found in James Adams, "Soviet Special Forces in America: The Day Before," Orbis, vol. 32, no. 2 (Spring 1988), pp. 202-203.

⁸⁷John J. Dziak, "The Soviet Approach to Special Operations," in Frank R. Barnett, B. Hugh Tovar and Richard H. Shultz, eds., Special Operations in U.S. Strategy (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1984), p. 111.

⁸⁸Mark Galeotti, "Russia's Intelligence Commandos," Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 7, no. 11 (November 1995), p. 483.

⁸⁹Thomas, p. 532.

and is considering establishing a unit specializing in nuclear terrorism.⁹⁰ Russian Spetsnaz units may no longer be operationally effective, and adequate replacements may have not yet been created.

C. U.S. MODELS

1. Nuclear Emergency Search Team

The NEST organization was developed in 1975, when DOE began to consider the possibility that a terrorist group might obtain or manufacture a nuclear device.⁹¹ When a nuclear threat is received, usually via the FBI, the DOE's Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Communicated Threat Credibility Center uses trained assessors with nuclear weapons expertise to evaluate the threat. If the threat sounded genuine, NEST personnel would fly in from around the country on military transport and divide the threatened city into search grids (the assumption is that the target would be a city to maximize the destructiveness of a nuclear explosion). The basic NEST tasks would be to detect, access, analyze, package, decontaminate, and remove the nuclear weapon. DOE aircraft can do photographic reconnaissance; helicopters equipped with radiation detectors can also sweep an area as well, but a nuclear weapon gives off little telltale

⁹⁰Mark Galeotti, "Russia's Intelligence Commandos."

⁹¹Summarized from Douglas Waller, "Nuclear Ninjas," Time, 8 January 1996, pp. 38-40.

radiation and would be nearly impossible to find from above in a dense urban area. Most of the search would have to be conducted on the ground, using minivans fitted with electron detectors. As many as 100 two-person teams, dressed as inconspicuously as possible, would be sent on foot patrols with handheld radiation detection equipment.

If a nuclear device was found, the NEST would rely on diagnostic and assessment teams to determine the best way to cripple the bomb. These teams also have equipment to contain a radiological dispersion device. Officially NEST would be onsite to advise the FBI in handling the threat, but operationally NEST would be in control and could call in military special operations counterterrorist squads if necessary to assist the FBI's domestic counterterrorism commandos.⁹² The NEST command post has a special communications system to provide links with the White House, the Pentagon, the CIA, the FBI, and the State Department.

Annual NEST exercises are conducted to test operational procedures. A "recent" exercise in New Orleans was said to have required more than 1000 people from NEST, the Pentagon, the FBI and the CIA, at a cost of around \$10 million.⁹³ Cost-cutting considerations have led to discussions about merging NEST with

⁹²Anthony L. Kimery, "Your Life May Depend on the Woman from NEST," The Washington Times, 23 October 1995, p. 12, Nexis, online.

⁹³Ibid., p. 14.

the DOD's Special Operations Command.⁹⁴ According to Anthony Kimery, "this [consolidation] would make deployment easier and more efficient, and would result in an even better flow of intelligence and analysis for NEST's special needs, given that the intelligence NEST now relies on is largely drawn from the CIA and Defense Department intelligence agencies anyway."⁹⁵ The counterargument to consolidation is that the Defense Department places too much emphasis on protecting its own troops on the battlefield and not enough on countering the threat to civilians.⁹⁶

This argument between government agencies shows that the United States has yet to define a comprehensive counterproliferation strategy. According to Senator Domenici:

We need better integration of all of the government's assets and more focus on coordinating our response to the danger posed by WMD. Considerable new thinking is required as well if this initiative is to succeed in giving us the ability to respond effectively to new proliferation dangers without creating a host of new problems for other aspects of our foreign and defense policies.⁹⁷

⁹⁴"Deep Attack Bombs, Commandos Sought for the New World Order," Defense Week, 3 January 1995, unpagged, Nexis, online.

⁹⁵Kimery, p. 16.

⁹⁶Gary Taubes, "Countering Nuclear Terrorism: Dwindling Capabilities?" Science, 24 February 1995, p. 1098.

⁹⁷Pete V. Domenici, "Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction," The Washington Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 1 (Winter 1995), p. 148.

Existing and emerging technological capabilities could be essential to the success of a counterproliferation strategy. One useful approach would be to adapt the NEST methodology to create a less narrowly specialized response force with the expertise concerning WMD provided electronically as needed.

2. Special Mission Units

The Department of Defense has an analogous capability to respond to terrorist chemical and biological weapons. Special Mission Units are an elite force within the U.S. Special Operations Command, "deep black operations units which operate in civilian clothes and handle the most sensitive and risky counter-terrorist and counter-intelligence operations. Because of the nature of their work, these men are given a long leash and lots of money with lax accountability to carry out their assignments."⁹⁸ Little unclassified information is available about Special Mission Units. The statement below is the most extensive summary available:

For crisis management, Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is prepared to provide its Special Mission Units to help resolve terrorist incidents. These units are always on alert, are trained in handling BW and CW agents and effects, have state-of-the-art protective suits and masks, and can render safe and recover BW and CW agents. These SOCOM units are supported by a specialized Chemical/Biological Response Unit, consisting of a Technical Escort Unit which is trained

⁹⁸"Special Ops Morale Dives," Intelligence Newsletter, 12 October 1995, unpagged, Nexis, online.

to search, sample, recover and transport agents; and on-call teams from the Army's and Navy's laboratories and CW/BW commands for expert knowledge on the scene. For consequence management, DOD would provide through FEMA the capabilities of Army NBC Defense Units, together with military medical care capabilities and supplies. A number of initiatives exist for upgrading these capabilities, as well as for strengthening their links to civilian agencies, which would be the first to respond to such incidents, and to foreign governments.⁹⁹

This indicates that the United States does have capabilities for chemical and biological as well as nuclear scenarios. These capabilities could serve as models for organizing operations in cooperation with foreign governments.

3. Commandant's Warfighting Lab

In October 1995, Marine Corps Commandant General Charles Krulak established the Commandant's Warfighting Lab (CWL) in Quantico, Virginia, "to determine how massive amounts of new technology can be used to prepare the service for what officials contend will be small, geographically limited military conflicts, rather than the global conflicts characteristic of the 20th century."¹⁰⁰ One of General Krulak's first initiatives was the

⁹⁹"Prepared Testimony of Dr. Mitchell B. Wallerstein, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation Policy, Before the House Committee on National Security Subcommittees on Military Procurement and Research and Development," Federal News Service, 20 June 1996, unpagged, Nexis, online.

¹⁰⁰Bryan Bender, "USMC Lab to Find Right Force Mix Amidst Technology Boom," Defense Daily, 9 January 1996, p. 34.

formation of a team of Marines trained to respond to chemical and biological weapons attacks on civilians or other targets. According to Mark Walsh, "the Biological/Chemical Weapons Response Force will be tied to its nerve center in Norfolk, Virginia, where an electronic reach-back advisory group of civilian biological and chemical experts will provide advice and instruction in matters being handled by the on-scene Marines."¹⁰¹

"Electronic reach-back" from a more generic response force to a stable of experts could be the best method for responding to certain types of WMD counterproliferation situations, particularly against terrorists when there is incomplete information about the exact nature of the threat they present. As Nicholas Negroponte has explained, it is faster and far cheaper to move digitized bits of information than the experts with the information.¹⁰² With electronic reach-back, a multipurpose and multinational response team begins to make sense, because the required expertise could be drawn from anywhere if the means of communication have been anticipated.

Despite the desirability of having, for example, a nuclear weapons designer onsite to provide expertise in the event of a nuclear weapons accident, this may not be practical, particularly

¹⁰¹Mark Walsh, "Marine Lab Will Be Hallmark of Warfighting," Defense Week, 2 January 1996, unpagged, Nexis, online.

¹⁰²Nicholas Negroponte, Being Digital (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), p. 11.

within the former Soviet Union. Anyone who has traveled in Russia knows that transportation, particularly to remote locations, can be extremely difficult to arrange. Making sure that the appropriate expert is onsite may be further complicated by incomplete initial reports. For example, it is possible to use fissile materials other than highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium in weapons; it is possible that Russia has produced, weaponized, and stockpiled these other materials.¹⁰³ Another complication is that the ideal WMD response team should have some capability for all types of WMD, as the threat posed may be a composite one.

Electronic reach-back could also help overcome linguistic difficulties associated with a multinational response team. A response force could communicate with appropriate experts by data sent directly from sensors, with voice communications providing supplementary capabilities. This could help reduce misunderstandings as data would not require translation and analysis onsite; the raw data could be processed by the experts according to their own preferred methodology. Video images could complement the other information streams to provide a picture of the situation that would be as complete as possible. Command and

¹⁰³Kathleen C. Bailey, "Mutual Reciprocal Inspections: Issues Regarding Next Steps," page 2 of prepared text of talk at the Nuclear Transparency Initiatives Workshop, Naval Postgraduate School, 29 February 1996.

control problems would be more easily resolved if everyone could receive the same data simultaneously.

Other modern technologies might also assist a less specialized response force. When the Israelis were preparing for their 1976 hostage-rescue operation at the Entebbe, Uganda, airport, they had built a physical model, to scale, of the airport for practice. (This was easy for them to do because Israeli engineers had designed the airport when the two nations were on friendly terms.)¹⁰⁴ Multimedia simulators could be used to convey a feel for a place, because it is not possible to build replicas of the setting of every potential hostage situation or of terrorist targets such as airports and embassies.

A bilateral multipurpose response team need not rely exclusively on specially-developed technology. Some emergency management information systems are making use of the Internet to coordinate the functions of alert, mobilization, command and control, and remedial action. For example, in early February 1996 Oregon suffered heavy rains that caused major flooding. Via the Internet anyone could receive weather data including satellite imagery from the Oregon Climate Service, information on stream flows and reservoir storage from the Army Corps of Engineers, and information on types of aid available and tips for

¹⁰⁴Negroponte, pp. 65-66.

recovering from a flood from the Federal Emergency Management Agency.¹⁰⁵

The Internet is already widely available in Russia and could be helpful in coordinating emergency management with local jurisdictions. According to John O'Mahony, "there are now about 100 servers operating throughout the country, and access providers can be found even in the more remote cities. Many indigenous users only subscribe to e-mail, an extremely useful and popular resource in a country where a letter, if it arrives at all, may take weeks to reach its destination."¹⁰⁶ The G-7 has proposed a Global Emergency Management Information Network Initiative (GEMINI) to create an international capability using the Internet to deal with all sorts of disasters.¹⁰⁷

"Unprecedented technology exists whereby all human emergency management knowledge could be instantly accessed to support all aspects of local to national emergency management."¹⁰⁸ This opens the possibility that a generic laptop computer linked to the

¹⁰⁵"Flood Victims' Web Resources," Associated Press Online, 13 February 1996, unpaged, Nexis, online.

¹⁰⁶John O'Mahony, "Coffee With the Virtual Comrades; The Net Revolution Has Hit the Former Soviet Union," The Independent, 12 February 1996, unpaged, Nexis, online.

¹⁰⁷"Information Society: G-7 Pilot Projects Picking Up Steam," Tech Europe, 6 July 1995, unpaged, Nexis, online.

¹⁰⁸From the GEMINI home page posted on the World Wide Web (<http://hoshi.cic.sfu.ca/~g7/progressG7.html>), accessed on 4 March 1996.

Internet could be a valuable resource for any response team in situations where operational security is not of paramount concern.

D. **SUMMARY**

The precedent of Russian and U.S. willingness to find a working arrangement to participate in joint peacekeeping in Bosnia may augur well for efforts to define a working arrangement for joint WMD counterproliferation contingencies. Common training and equipment provided under the CTR program may facilitate cooperation in the WMD realm.

A model for such cooperation might be found in the Soviet Spetsnaz experience, but current financial difficulties and changes in missions would likely hamper the Russian ability to stand up a WMD counterproliferation response team. The U.S. models of NEST and Special Mission Units currently function, but might be more effective with Russian information-sharing--an arrangement that might be facilitated by innovative technology being developed by the Commandant's Warfighting Lab. This is not only true for contingencies involving WMD materials of Russian origin; Russian expertise might provide a solution to otherwise intractable situations regarding a variety of other WMD proliferation challenges.

V. FRAMEWORKS FOR IMPLEMENTING COOPERATION

There are at least three multinational "umbrellas" under which cooperation with Russia in counterproliferation might be pursued more effectively: under NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP), under the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and under the Group of Seven plus Russia. Each of these institutions could contribute to a Russian-American counterproliferation response force, but the primary arrangement would have to be bilateral and reciprocal to secure both parties' agreement. An incremental approach similar to the Vienna Document Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) scheme could make both Russia and the United States more comfortable about pursuing joint military options to deal with WMD counterproliferation contingencies.

A. MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION

There is already a fairly extensive range of Partnership for Peace activities between NATO and selected states of the NIS, such as joint peacekeeping exercises, which could serve as a model for future cooperation. However, the reluctant participation of Russia, which inherited the bulk of the Soviet arsenal and defense facilities, is a major cause for concern. Military cooperation with Russia is contentious, for Russia would like to be treated on an equal basis with the United States as a

superpower. Russian non-cooperation might be overcome through the careful design of multilateral mechanisms which allow Russia to maintain its national self-respect. Russia dislikes PFP because it feels that it is treated as a junior partner and placed in a politically subordinate position. As seen in the Bosnian peace enforcement deployment, Russia will go to considerable lengths to not be seen as subordinate to its recent adversary. Russia prefers to deal with the OSCE, an institution based on an initiative from Moscow, in which all members have equal standing.

The OSCE began as a regular series of conferences on European security issues, and was originally called the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It has become an organization with several functions, including acting as a clearinghouse to pass notifications required by the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty. For this purpose, the OSCE has developed a computer-based communications network that links 43 OSCE capitals, which includes all the NATO and PFP nations.¹⁰⁹ For ease of comprehension, most of the traffic is in the form of strictly formatted messages, but the network has a secure voice capability as well. There is currently no provision for the OSCE to intervene militarily in any capacity, but the OSCE's network

¹⁰⁹Joris Janssen Lok, "Security in Numbers on the OSCE Network," Jane's Defence Weekly, 24 January 1996, p. 27.

might be useful in alerting a previously planned multinational response force of the imminent need for action.

The Group of Seven (G-7) is primarily an economic organization, one that has shown great sympathy for Russian attempts to gain admittance. The G-7 agreed to a summit in April 1996 in Moscow to discuss Russian nuclear safety issues. The G-7 could increase the effectiveness of assistance programs to Russia in WMD proliferation by coordinating their activities and making sure that they address Russian priorities as well. Another advantage of the G-7 is that it brings Japan into the discussion; European security institutions do not address the fact that Russia extends far into Asia. The assistance programs could provide a common base of training and equipment which could be used by a multinational response force.

B. BILATERAL RUSSIAN-AMERICAN COOPERATION

Russian-American cooperation in WMD counterproliferation would build on the strong tradition of Soviet-U.S. cooperation in arms control. The INF, START, and CFE treaties as well as the Vienna Document CSBMs all have provisions for reciprocal controlled visits by inspection teams from the member countries of sites containing nuclear delivery systems and other strategically significant treaty-limited items. The INF treaty set the pattern by ensuring absolute parity between the parties: what one can do in the other's country is precisely reciprocated.

Great care was taken in drafting the treaties to state each country's rights and responsibilities, and committees were established to meet at regular intervals to iron out unforeseen difficulties. The Russians have been conscientious about meeting their treaty obligations within their limited resources. The Russians accept these responsibilities willingly because doing so gives them the status and respect formerly accorded the USSR, the state with which most of these treaties were originally negotiated.

C. CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING EXERCISES

Objections to bilateral cooperation on counterproliferation might be overcome through arrangements comparable to those under the current Vienna Document CSBMs scheme. Russia has incrementally agreed to more intrusive inspections by foreign military officers on its territory because of the controls and safeguards guaranteed by the agreement. CSBMs allow the Russians to control what foreigners see, and over time the Russians have allowed foreigners to see more troops and equipment. This aspect of CSBMs would appeal to all sides, including the United States, which could initially heavily limit what is shared and relax the restrictions later if this was seen as desirable.

A CSBM-type structure would prescribe full reciprocity so that no side would be placed at a disadvantage by the exchange. It is perhaps natural to expect that both sides would want to

receive as much as possible from the other and give as little as possible in return. One side might be willing to support the other to a disproportionate extent under some circumstances if it expected that under different circumstances it could receive greater support in return. A CSBM-type structure would have provisions for what types of assistance could be requested, with what timeliness, under what circumstances, etc. The structure would have to be exercised to develop confidence that it would work. With increasing confidence, the structure might be expanded. Even if this structure never brought a bilateral response team into action, it might set the groundwork for creating a "permissive environment" instead of a hostile one in which unilateral actions could take place under agreed-upon circumstances.¹¹⁰

A program of bilateral SOF cooperative exercises in limited counterproliferation scenarios would make a case that WMD proliferators face effective countermeasures and have nowhere to hide. The exercises would assure Russia, the United States, and U.S. allies of another form of protection against proliferation if and when it did indeed occur. In the past, protection was provided by U.S. theater and strategic nuclear forces, but today there is skepticism--at least in some quarters--that extended

¹¹⁰Simon, p. 36.

nuclear deterrence would be effective. According to Stephen Cambone and Patrick Garrity, "not only are American nuclear weapons thought to frighten potential allies and coalition partners, but hostile regional powers may also believe that Washington lacks the will to employ nuclear weapons."¹¹¹ In some circumstances, SOF intervention capabilities for counterproliferation purposes could be a plausible substitute for extended nuclear deterrence; bilateral exercises could make these capabilities convincing and endow them with some deterrent potential.

D. SUMMARY

A bilateral framework for cooperation which emphasizes reciprocity would probably be acceptable to both the United States and Russia. The incentive is that by gradually increasing cooperation both sides would understand and perhaps trust each other's capabilities and methodologies. This framework would have to be exercised so that this understanding and trust could grow. Even if the United States and Russia did not ever cooperate in an actual joint strategic special operation, the exercises might increase the willingness of one to allow the other to carry out such operations unilaterally.

¹¹¹Stephen A. Cambone and Patrick J. Garrity, "The Future of U.S. Nuclear Policy," Survival, vol. 36, no. 4 (Winter 1994-95), p. 88.

VI. CONCLUSION

This thesis has examined the desirability and feasibility of Russian-American cooperation in using special operations forces to conduct joint strategic special operations. It has compared Russian and U.S. views of the future security environment, particularly with regard to WMD proliferation contingencies that might exceed the capabilities of civilian agencies, looking for areas of overlap that could serve as the basis for mutually acceptable cooperative approaches to military options to deal with these threats. Information-sharing could serve the purpose of Russian-American cooperation in WMD counterproliferation, and this may initially be the most likely area of cooperation.

Any Russian-American cooperative effort would reveal to the other side sensitive information about the capabilities and vulnerabilities in that area of cooperation. A major difficulty is that while the United States and Russia currently enjoy good relations, a change in the Russian political leadership could rapidly reverse this, and previously provided information could be used to the detriment of U.S. security interests. The proposed solution to this difficulty is to make agreements to share needed information only when the circumstances of the situation make it expedient to do so.

The United States may still have a "window of opportunity"

to engage the Russians in bilateral counterproliferation activities, one component of which could be contingency SOF counterforce exercises. Because it is the primary inheritor of the former Soviet Union's WMD arsenal, Russia's involvement is essential to prevent a loss of control over these WMD materials and associated expertise. The disorganization following the breakup of the Soviet Union and current economic difficulties in the former Soviet states make this region the most likely source of leakage of weapons of mass destruction, fissile materials and WMD expertise. The cooperation envisioned by this thesis need not require substantial new resources; equipment and training already provided or in place could be sufficient if innovative operational planning was undertaken. The effectiveness of any policy to prevent or counter WMD proliferation could be enhanced by including Russia in its development and execution.

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